Providing an efficient revocation mechanism for identity-based encryption (IBE) is very important since a user's credential (or private key) can be expired or revealed. Revocable IBE (RIBE) is an extension of IBE that provides an efficient revocation mechanism. Previous RIBE schemes essentially use the complete subtree (CS) scheme for key revocation. In this paper, we present a new technique for RIBE that uses the efficient subset difference (SD) scheme or the layered subset difference (LSD) scheme instead of using the CS scheme to improve the size of update keys. Following our new technique, we first propose an efficient RIBE scheme in prime-order bilinear groups by combining the IBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen and the SD scheme and prove its selective security under the standard assumption. Our RIBE scheme is the first RIBE scheme in bilinear groups that has O(r) number of group elements in update keys. Next, we also propose another RIBE scheme in composite-order bilinear groups and prove its full security under static assumptions. Our RIBE schemes also can be integrated with the LSD scheme to reduce the size of private keys.
Introduction
Identity-based encryption (IBE) is a new paradigm of public-key encryption (PKE) that uses the identity string of a user for the public key of the user [5, 6, 38, 40] . IBE and its extensions like hierarchical IBE (HIBE) [5, 12, 16] , attribute-based encryption (ABE) [3, 14, 35] , predicate encryption (PE) [8, 17, 21] , and functional encryption (FE) [7, 13] opened new applications of encryption systems such as the delegation of decryption capability, access control in encrypted data, searches on encrypted data, and functional evaluation on encrypted data. If an IBE scheme is used in real-world applications, an efficient revocation mechanism for IBE that can handle dynamic credentials of users is needed since a user's credential can be revealed or expired. Revocable IBE (RIBE) is an extension of IBE that can handle the dynamic credentials of users by providing an efficient revocation mechanism. An ideal revocation method in IBE is that a sender just creates a ciphertext without worrying about the revocation of a receiver and only the receiver needs to check the revocation of his credential to decrypt the ciphertext.
Boneh and Franklin [6] proposed the first RIBE scheme by representing an identity as ID T where ID is the real identity and T is a current time, but it is inefficient and not scalable because of the requirement of secure channels between the center and all users. A scalable RIBE scheme was introduced by Boldyreva, Goyal, and Kumar [4] . They defined the first formal definition of RIBE and proposed a selectively secure RIBE scheme by combining the fuzzy IBE (FIBE) scheme of Sahai and Waters [35] and the complete subtree (CS) scheme of Naor et al. [28] . After that fully secure RIBE schemes were proposed [25, 37] . Recently, the design technique of RIBE was successfully applied to achieve a revocable HIBE (RHIBE) scheme, a revocable-storage ABE (RS-ABE) scheme, and a revocable-storage PE (RS-PE) scheme [18, 34, 36] .
Although efficient RIBE schemes and their extended schemes were proposed, the main design principle of these constructions essentially follows that of Boldyreva et al. [4] that uses the CS scheme of Naor et al. [28] for key revocation. The CS scheme is one instance of the general subset cover framework of Naor et al. and there are other efficient subset cover schemes like the subset difference (SD) scheme [28] and the layered subset difference (LSD) scheme [15] . Therefore, we ask the following natural question in this paper.
"Can we build an efficient RIBE scheme by using the SD scheme (or the LSD scheme) instead of using the CS scheme?" If it is possible, then the size of update keys can be reduced from O(r log(N max /r)) to O(r) group elements by slightly increasing the size of private keys where N max is the maximum number of users and r is the number of revoked users.
Our Results
In this paper, we give the affirmative answer for the above question by presenting a new technique that combines an IBE scheme and the SD scheme. The following is our results:
New Technique for RIBE. We first present a new technique for RIBE that combines an IBE scheme and the SD scheme instead of using the CS scheme. The CS scheme was easily integrated with an IBE scheme since an assigned key for a subset in the CS scheme is independent of each other [28] . However, it is unclear how to integrate the SD scheme with an IBE scheme since an assigned key for a subset in the SD scheme is dependent on another [28] . We use a random polynomial of degree one to solve the complex key assignment problem in the SD scheme, and integrate the SD scheme with an IBE scheme by using the observation that the SD scheme is related with a single member revocation scheme which can be implemented by a random polynomial of degree one. However, this idea does not directly lead to a secure scheme because of collusion attacks. To provides the security against collusion attacks, we personalize the private key components with an identity ID and constrain the usage of update key components by a time T .
RIBE with Selective Security. Following our new technique for RIBE, we construct an RIBE scheme in prime-order bilinear groups by combining the IBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen [5] and the SD scheme of Naor et al. [28] , and then we prove its security in the selective revocation list model under the standard assumption. In our RIBE scheme, the number of group elements in the public parameters, a private key, an update key, and a ciphertext is O(1), O(log 2 N max ), O(r), and O(1) respectively where N max is the maximum number of users and r is the number of revoked users. Compared with the previous RIBE schemes [4, 25, 37] that have O(r log(N max /r)) group elements in an update key, our RIBE scheme just has O(r) group elements in an update key. If the LSD scheme of Halevy and Shamir [15] is used instead of the SD scheme, then the number of group elements in a private key is reduced from O(log 2 N max ) to O(log 1.5 N max ).
RIBE with Full Security. Next, we propose another RIBE scheme in composite-order bilinear groups by combining the IBE scheme of Lewko and Waters [24] and the SD scheme, and the we prove its security in the full model under static assumptions. To prove the security in the full model, we use the dual system encryption technique of Waters [24, 41] . However, the original dual system encryption technique that was used to prove the security of IBE and HIBE is not directly applicable to an RIBE scheme since the adversary of RIBE can request a private key for a challenge identity ID * and an update key for a challenge time T * that were not allowed in the security model of IBE. Additionally, the complex key assignment of the SD scheme introduces another difficulty in the proof of using the dual system encryption technique. To solve these problems, we carefully redesign the semi-functional types of each key and hybrid games for the dual system encryption.
Our Techniques
The CS scheme can be easily integrated with an IBE scheme to construct an RIBE scheme since it assigns a random independent key for each subset in CS [4] . In contrast, the SD scheme cannot be easily integrated with an IBE scheme to construct an RIBE scheme since it assigns a dependent key for each subset in SD by using a pseudo-random generator [28] . To overcome the complex and dependent key assignment of the SD scheme, we use the observation that a subset S i, j in SD can be interpreted as single member revocation.
In the SD scheme, a subset S i, j that is associated with two nodes v i and v j of a binary tree is defined as the set of leaf nodes that belong to T i \ T j where T i is a subtree rooted at v i and T j is a subtree rooted at v j . If we define a group GL as the set of subsets S i, j such that v i is the same and the depth d j of v j is also the same, then the subset S i, j can be interpreted as this subset S i, j is almost same as GL except that one member node v j is excluded (or revoked). This observation was implicitly made by Lee et al. [20] and they used this observation to construct a public-key trace and revoke scheme by combining the SD scheme and a single-revocation encryption scheme in bilinear groups. To use this observation for RIBE, we use the polynomial-based revocation scheme of Naor and Pinkas [30] . That is, a revocation scheme that uses a random polynomial of degree one can be used to revoke a single user. In the SD scheme, the collection S is defined as the set of subsets S i, j where v i and v j is a node in a tree and v j is a descendant of v i . As mentioned before, the subsets S i, j can be categorized as groups and a one group GL is defined as a set of subsets S i, j such that v i is the same and the depth d j of v j is the same. To use the polynomial-based revocation scheme, we assign a random polynomial f GL (x) = a GL x + α once to each group where a GL is a random value and α is a fixed value for all groups. In a group GL, each member L i that is associated with a node v j has a share g f GL (L j ) where L i is a identifier of the node v j . If one member L j is revoked, then his share g f GL (L j ) is revealed to all members, then any member in the group GL except the revoked member can reconstruct the secret g α by using the Lagrange interpolation method since two points of a degree one polynomial are enough for reconstruction. However, this simple method is insecure against collusion attacks since any two members can collude to reconstruct the secret α.
To provide the security against collusion attacks, the share of a member is personalized by using his identity ID and the share of the revoked member is constrained by using a revoked time T . That is the personalized private key for a member L j is defined as g f GL (L j ) H(ID) r 1 , g r 1 where H is a hash function and the time-constrained update key for a revoked member L j is defined as g f GL (L j ) H(T ) r 2 , g −r 2 . Thus a non-revoked member in the group can derive a decryption key as g α H(ID) r 1 H(T ) r 2 , g −r 1 , g −r 2 from his personalized private key and the time-constrained update key. Note that if non-revoked two members collude, then they only can derive g α H(ID) r 1 H(ID ) r 2 , g −r 1 , g −r 2 that are not useful to decrypt a ciphertext. In the RIBE scheme, a private key for a user consists of many subsets and an update key for a time also consists of many subsets.
Related Work
Certificate Revocation in PKE. In PKE that uses public-key infrastructure (PKI), CRL and OCSP are the traditional methods to revoke certificates of users. However, these methods are inefficient in terms of transmission costs and computation costs since CRL includes all serial numbers of revoked certificates and OCSP requires the generation of digital signature for each queries. Furthermore, they also require for each client who uses a certificate to implement a path validation module to check the validity of a digital signature in CRL or OCSP. A better solution named certificate revocation system (CRS) was proposed by Micali [27] and it uses a hash-chain to check the validity of the certificate. This method was improved by Naor and Nissim [29] and Aiello et al. [1] . Although CRS improves the previous CRL and OCSP, these methods still require a sender to check the validity of a certificate through a heavy infrastructure and this problem is the serious point of these methods. Gentry [11] solved this problem by introducing certificate-based encryption (CBE) and proposed an efficient CBE scheme in bilinear groups.
Revocation in IBE.
As mentioned, an ideal revocation method for IBE is that a sender can create a ciphertext as the same as that of IBE without worrying about the revocation of a receiver and only the receiver checks the revocation of his key to decrypt the ciphertext. Boneh and Franklin [6] proposed the first IBE scheme that support the revocation capability, but their scheme is inefficient and not scalable since each user should be connected to the center through a secure channel to receive an updated private key. A scalable and RIBE scheme was proposed by Boldyreva et al. [4] . They constructed an RIBE scheme by combining the FIBE scheme of Sahai and Waters [35] and the CS scheme and proved it selective security. After that, fully secure RIBE schemes were proposed by Libert and Vergnaud [25] and Seo and Emura [37] , and Seo and Emura refined the security model of RIBE by considering the decryption key exposure attacks. Recently, Park et al. [33] proposed an RIBE scheme with shorter private key and update key by using multilinear maps, but the size of the public parameters is dependent to the number of users. The design technique of RIBE also can be applicable to the extensions of IBE, like HIBE, ABE, and PE. Boldyreva et al. [4] already proposed a revocable ABE (R-ABE) scheme. Seo and Emura [36] proposed an RHIBE scheme by using the HIBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen. For cloud storage, Sahai et al. [34] proposed RS-ABE schemes that provide the key revocation and ciphertext update functionalities, and Lee et al. [18] proposed improved RS-ABE and RS-PE schemes by introducing self-updatable encryption.
Revocation Encryption. Revocation encryption (RE) is a special type of broadcast encryption (BE) [10] such that a sender creates a ciphertext by specifying a set of revoked users R instead of a set of receivers S and a receiver can decrypt a ciphertext if he is not included in the set of revoked users [23, 28, 30] . However, there is a crucial difference between the security model of RE and that of RIBE. In RE, the collusion of nonrevoked users is not allowed since an adversary cannot request private keys for non-revoked users [23] , but the collusion of non-revoked users is allowed in RIBE since an adversary can request private keys for nonrevoked users except the challenge user ID * [4] . Although RE alone does not directly solve the revocation problem of IBE, RE can be combined with IBE or its extensions to directly revoke a set of revoked users by specifying a receiver and a revoked set R in a ciphertext [2, 19, 31, 39] . This approach requires a sender to take care of the revocation of users.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the subset difference method and define the syntax and the security model of revocable IBE.
Full Binary Tree
A full binary tree BT is a tree data structure where each node except the leaf nodes has two child nodes. Let N max be the number of leaf nodes in BT . The number of all nodes in BT is 2N max − 1 and for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N max − 1 we denote by v i a node in BT . The depth d i of a node v i is the length of the path from the root node to the node. The root node is at depth zero. The depth of BT is the length of the path from the root node to a leaf node. A level of BT is a set of all nodes at given depth. For any node v i ∈ BT , T i is defined as a subtree that is rooted at v i . For any two nodes v i , v j ∈ BT such that v j is a descendant of v i , T i, j is defined as a subtree T i − T j , that is, all nodes that are descendants of v i but not v j . For any node v i ∈ BT , S i is defined as the set of leaf nodes in T i . Similarly, S i, j is defined as the set of leaf nodes in T i, j , that is,
For any node v i ∈ BT , L i is defined as an identifier that is a fixed and unique string. The identifier of each node in the tree is assigned as follows: Each edge in the tree is assigned with 0 or 1 depending on whether the edge is connected to its left or right child node. The identifier L i of a node v i is defined as the bitstring obtained by reading all the labels of edges in the path from the root node to the node v i . We define L(v i ) be a mapping from a node v i to an identifier L i . We also define L(T i ) be a mapping from a subtree T i to the identifier L i of the node v i and L(T i, j ) be a mapping from a subtree
For a full binary tree BT and a subset R of leaf nodes, ST (BT , R) is defined as the Steiner Tree induced by the set R and the root node, that is, the minimal subtree of BT that connects all the leaf nodes in R and the root node. we simply denote ST (BT , R) by ST (R).
Subset Difference Method
The subset difference (SD) method is a special instance of the subset cover framework of Naor, Naor, and Lotspiech [28] that is a general methodology for revocation schemes. The well-known complete subtree (CS) scheme is also one instance of the subset cover framework. The original subset cover framework consists of a subset assignment part and a key assignment part. In this paper, we define the subset cover framework by using the subset assignment part only. The formal definition is given as follows: Definition 2.1 (Subset Cover). A subset cover scheme for the set N = {1, . . . , N max } of users consists of four PPT algorithms Setup, Assign, Cover, and Match, which are defined as follows: Setup(N max ). The setup algorithm takes as input the maximum number N max of users and outputs a collection S of subsets S 1 , . . . , S w where S i ⊆ N .
Assign(S, u). The assigning algorithm takes as input the collection S and a user u ∈ N , and outputs a private set PV u = {S j 1 , . . . , S j n } that is associated with the user u.
Cover(S, R). The covering algorithm takes as the collection S and a revoked set R ⊂ N of users, and outputs a covering set CV R = {S i 1 . . . , S i m } that is a partition of the non-revoked users N \ R into disjoint subsets S i 1 , . . . , S i m such that S \ R = m k=1 S i k .
Match(CV R , PV u ). The matching algorithm takes as input a covering set CV R = {S i 1 , . . . , S i m } and a private set PV u = {S j 1 , . . . , S j n } of a user u. It outputs (S i k , S j k ) such that S i k ∈ CV R , u ∈ S i k , and S j k ∈ PV u , or it outputs ⊥.
The correctness of subset cover is defined as follows: For all S generated by Setup, all PV u generated by Assign, and any R, it is required that:
• If u ∈ R, then Match(Cover(S, R), PV u ) =⊥.
Note that the exact conditions of the subsets outputted by the matching algorithm is defined by the specific instance of the SC scheme.
As mentioned, the SD scheme is one instance of the SC scheme and it was proposed by Naor et al. [28] as an improvement on the CS scheme. The SD scheme is described as follows:
This algorithm takes as input the maximum number N max of users. Let N max = 2 n for simplicity. It first sets a full binary tree BT of depth n. Each user is assigned to a different leaf node in BT . The collection S of SD is the set of all subsets {S i, j } where v i , v j ∈ BT and v j is a descendant of v i . It outputs the full binary tree BT .
SD.Assign(BT , u): This algorithm takes as input the tree BT and a user u ∈ N . Let v u be the leaf node of BT that is assigned to the user u. Let (v k 0 , v k 1 , . . . , v k n ) be the path from the root node v k 0 to the leaf node v k n = v u . It first sets a private set PV u as an empty one. For all i, j ∈ {k 0 , k 1 , . . . , k n } such that v j is a descendant of v i , it adds the subset S i, j defined by two nodes v i and v j in the path into PV u . It outputs the private set PV u = {S i, j }.
SD.Cover(BT , R):
This algorithm takes as input the tree BT and a revoked set R of users. It first sets a subtree T as ST (R), and then it builds a covering set CV R iteratively by removing nodes from T until T consists of just a single node as follows:
1. It finds two leaf nodes v i and v j in T such that the least-common-ancestor v of v i and v j does not contain any other leaf nodes of T in its subtree. Let v l and v k be the two child nodes of v such that v i is a descendant of v l and v j is a descendant of v k . If there is only one leaf node left, it makes v i = v j to the leaf node, v to be the root of T and v l = v k = v.
2. If v l = v i , then it adds the subset S l,i to CV R ; likewise, if v k = v j , it adds the subset S k, j to CV R .
3. It removes from T all the descendants of v and makes v a leaf node.
It outputs the covering set CV R = {S i, j }.
This algorithm takes input as a covering set CV R = {S i, j } and a private set PV u = {S i, j }. It finds two subsets S i, j and S i , j such that S i, j ∈ CV R , S i , j ∈ PV u , and
where d j is the depth of v j . If it found two subsets, then it outputs (S i, j , S i , j ). Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Lemma 2.2 ( [28]
). Let N max be the number of leaf nodes in a full binary tree and r be the size of a revoked set. In the SD scheme, the size of a private set is O(log 2 N max ) and the size of a covering set is at most 2r − 1.
Remark 2.3. The covering algorithm of the SD scheme is only defined for r ≥ 1. One simple way to handle the case r = 0 is to use a dummy user that is always revoked. In the SD scheme, the size of the covering set is at most 2r − 1, but it is rough worst-case analysis and the size is always smaller than that of the CS scheme since a subset in the CS scheme is defined by a subset in the SD scheme [28] . The better analysis of this covering set size is given by Martin et al. [26] .
The layered subset difference (LSD) scheme was proposed by Halevy and Shamir [15] to reduce the size of a private set in the SD scheme. The SD scheme in a cryptosystem generally can be replaced by the LSD scheme since the LSD scheme is a special case of the SD scheme.
Lemma 2.4 ( [15]
). Let N max be the number of leaf nodes in a full binary tree and r be the size of a revoked set. In the LSD scheme, the size of a private set is O(log 1.5 N max ) and the size of a covering set is at most 4r − 2.
Revocable Identity-Based Encryption
Revocable IBE (RIBE) is an extension of IBE that can revoke a users if his credential is expired or revealed [4] . In RIBE, a sender creates a ciphertext for a receiver identity ID and a time T . A user first obtains a (long-term) private key SK ID for his identity ID from a center, and the center periodically broadcasts an update key UK T,R for a time T and a revoked identity set R. If a user ID is not revoked in R of the update key, then he can derive a (short-term) decryption key DK ID,T for his identity ID and the time T from SK ID and UK T,R and he can use this decryption key to decrypt the ciphertext. Note that the center does not encrypt an update key for broadcasting. The syntax of RIBE is formally defined as follows: Definition 2.5 (Revocable IBE). A revocable IBE (RIBE) scheme that is associated with the identity space I, the time space T , and the message space M, consists of seven algorithms Setup, GenKey, UpdateKey, DeriveKey, Encrypt, Decrypt, and Revoke, which are defined as follows: 
• If (ID ∈ R), then DeriveKey(SK ID ,UK T,R , PP) =⊥ with all but negligible probability.
•
=⊥ with all but negligible probability.
The security model of RIBE was introduced by Boldyreva et al. [4] and it was refined by Seo and Emura [37] by considering the decryption key exposure attacks. In this paper, we follow the refined security model of RIBE. In the security game of RIBE, an adversary adaptively request a private key for an identity ID, an update key for a time T and a current revocation list RL, and a decryption key for an identity ID and a time T . In the challenge step, the adversary submits a challenge identity ID * , a challenge time T * , and challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 with additional restrictions and he receives a challenge ciphertext CT * that is an encryption of a message M * µ for a random bit µ. After that, the adversary may request additional private key, update key, and decryption key queries, and finally he outputs a guess µ . If his guess is correct, then he wins the game. The security of RIBE is formally defined as follows: Definition 2.6 (Security). The security of RIBE under chosen plaintext attacks is defined in terms of the following experiment between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A:
1. Setup: C generates a master key MK, a revocation list RL, a state ST , and public parameters PP by running Setup(1 λ , N max ). It keeps MK, RL, ST to itself and gives PP to A.
Phase 1:
A adaptively request a polynomial number of queries. These queries are processed as follows:
• If this is a private key query for an identity ID, then it gives the corresponding private key SK ID to A by running GenKey(ID, MK, ST, PP).
• If this is an update key query for a time T , then it gives the corresponding update key UK T,R to A by running UpdateKey(T, RL, MK, ST, PP).
• If this is a decryption key query for an identity ID and a time T , then it gives the corresponding decryption key DK ID,T to A by running DeriveKey(SK ID ,UK T,R , PP).
• If this is a revocation query for an identity ID and a revocation time T , then it updates the revocation list RL by running Revoke(ID, T, RL, ST ) with the restriction: The revocation query for a time T cannot be queried if the update key query for the time T was already requested.
Note that we assume that the update key queries and the revocation queries are requested in nondecreasing order of time.
3. Challenge: A submits a challenge identity ID * , a challenge time T * , and two challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 with equal length with the following restrictions:
• If a private key query for an identity ID such that ID = ID * was requested, then the identity ID * should be revoked at some time T such that T ≤ T * .
• The decryption key query for ID * and T * was not requested.
C flips a random coin µ ∈ {0, 1} and gives the challenge ciphertext CT * to A by running Encrypt(ID * , T * , M * µ , PP). 4. Phase 2: A may continue to request a polynomial number of additional queries subject to the same restrictions as before.
Guess:
Finally, A outputs a guess µ ∈ {0, 1}, and wins the game if µ = µ .
The advantage of A is defined as Adv
where the probability is taken over all the randomness of the experiment. An RIBE scheme is (fully) secure in the selective revocation list model under chosen plaintext attacks if for all PPT adversary A, the advantage of A in the above experiment is negligible in the security parameter λ .
We can also define the selective revocation list model that is weaker than the previous security model of RIBE. In the selective revocation list model, an adversary should submits a challenge identity ID * , a challenge time T * , and revocation identity set R * at the time T * before he receives the public parameters. This model was introduced by Boldyreva et al. [4] to prove their revocable ABE scheme. Definition 2.7 (Selective Revocation List Security). The selective revocation list security of RIBE under chosen plaintext attacks is similar to the above security except that the adversary A submits a challenge identity ID * , a challenge time T * , and a revoked identity set R * on the time T * before receiving the public parameters. The advantage of A is defined as Adv
where the probability is taken over all the randomness of the experiment. An RIBE scheme is secure in the selective revocation list model under chosen plaintext attacks if for all PPT adversary A, the advantage of A in the above experiment is negligible in the security parameter λ .
Revocable IBE with Selective Security
In this section, we propose an RIBE scheme in prime-order bilinear groups and prove its security in the selective revocation list model under the standard assumption.
Bilinear Groups of Prime Order
Let G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of same prime order p and g be a generator of G. The bilinear map e : G × G → G T has the following properties:
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃g such that e(g, g) has order p, that is, e(g, g) is a generator of G T .
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operations in G and G T as well as the bilinear map e are all efficiently computable. Furthermore, we assume that the description of G and G T includes generators of G and G T respectively.
Complexity Assumptions
Assumption 3.1 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman, DBDH). Let (p, G, G T , e) be a description of the bilinear group of prime order p. Let g be generators of subgroups G. The DBDH assumption is that if the challenge tuple
where the probability is taken over random choices of a, b, c, d ∈ Z p .
Construction
Let ∆ i,I be a Lagrange coefficient which is defined as ∆ i,I (x) = ∏ j∈I, j =i x− j i− j for an index i ∈ Z p and a set of indexes I in Z p . Our RIBE scheme is described as follows:
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and the maximum number N max of users.
1. It first generates bilinear groups G, G T of prime order p of bit size Θ(λ ). Let g be a random generator of G. It selects a random exponent α ∈ Z p and random elements
It sets a user list UL that contains a tuple (ID, u) as an empty one, and also sets a function list FL that contains a tuple (GL, f GL (x)) for a group label GL as an empty one.
2. It obtains BT by running SD.Setup(N max ). Let S be the collection of all subsets S i, j of BT . For each S i, j ∈ S, it sets GL = L i d j and performs the following: If (GL, * ) ∈ FL, then it selects a random polynomial f GL (x) of degree 1 such that f GL (0) = α and saves (GL, f GL (x)) to FL.
3. It outputs a master key MK = (α, FL), an empty revocation list RL, a state ST = (BT ,UL), and public parameters
RIBE.GenKey(ID, MK, ST, PP): This algorithm takes as input an identity ID ∈ I, the master key MK, the state ST = (BT ,UL), and public parameters PP.
1. It assigns the identity ID to a leaf node v u in BT that is not yet assigned where u ∈ N is an index that is assigned to ID. It saves (ID, u) to UL. Next, it obtains PV u = {S i, j } by running SD.Assign(BT , u).
2.
For each S i, j ∈ PV u , it performs the following steps: It sets GL = L i d j and retrieves (GL, f GL (x)) from FL. Next, it selects a random exponent r 1 ∈ Z p and creates a personalized private key as
3. Finally, it outputs the updated state ST and a private key SK ID = PV u , PSK ID,S i, j S i, j ∈PV u .
RIBE.UpdateKey(T, RL, MK, ST, PP):
This algorithm takes as input a time T , the revocation list RL, the master key MK, the state ST = (BT ,UL), and public parameters PP.
1. It first defines the revoked set R of user identities on the time T from RL. That is, if there exists (ID , T ) such that (ID , T ) ∈ RL for any T ≤ T , then ID ∈ R. It also defines the revoked index set RI ⊆ N of the revoked identity set R by using UL. Next, it obtains CV RI = {S i, j } by running SD.Cover(BT , RI).
2.
For each S i, j ∈ CV R , it performs the following steps: It sets GL = L i d j and retrieves (GL, f GL (x)) from FL. Next, it selects a random exponent r 2 ∈ Z p and creates a time-constrained update key as
3. Finally, it outputs the updated state ST and an update key UK T,R = CV RI , TUK T,S i, j S i, j ∈CV RI .
RIBE.DeriveKey(SK ID ,UK T,R , PP): This algorithm takes as input a private key SK ID = (PV u , {PSK ID,S i, j }), an update key UK T,R = (CV RI , {TUK T,S i, j }), and the public parameters PP.
It chooses random exponents r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z p and creates decryption key components as
3. Finally, it outputs a decryption key
Note that the components are formed
RIBE.Encrypt(ID, T, M, PP): This algorithm takes as input an identity ID, a time T , a message M, and the public parameters PP. It first chooses a random exponent s ∈ Z p and outputs a ciphertext by implicitly including ID and T as
, and the public parameters PP. If (ID = ID ) ∧ (T = T ), then it outputs the encrypted message M as M = C · ∏
Correctness
Let SK ID be a private key for an identity ID, and UK T,R be an update key for a time T and a revoked identity set R. If ID / ∈ R, then two subsets (S i, j , S i , j ) such that S i, j ∈ CV RI , S i , j ∈ PV u , and i = i ∧ d j = d j ∧ j = j can be obtained from the correctness of the SD scheme and a decryption key for ID and T can be derived from PSK ID,S i , j = (K 0 , K 1 ) and TUK T,S i, j = (U 0 ,U 1 ) as
since PSK ID,S i , j and TUK T,S i, j share the same polynomial f GL (x) and L j = L j where
Let CT ID,T be a ciphertext for an identity ID and a time T , and DK ID ,T be a decryption key for an identity ID and a time T . If (ID = ID ) ∧ (T = T ), then the decryption algorithm correctly computes a session key by the following equation as
Security Analysis
To prove the security of our RIBE scheme in the selective revocation list model, we use the partitioning method that was widely used for the security proof of other IBE schemes [5, 6, 40] . However, the direct use of the partitioning method does not work in RIBE since an adversary can request a private key query for a challenge identity ID * and an update key query for a challenge time T * that were not allowed in the security model of IBE. That is, the simulator that uses the partitioning method of IBE cannot handle the private key query for ID * and the update key query for T * .
To overcome this difficulty of using the partitioning method, we use the fact that a random polynomial f (x) of degree one such that f (0) = α can be determined by one fixed point (0, α) and another random point (x,ŷ). That is, if the adversary requests a private key for ID * or an update key for T * , then the simulator directly uses the valuesŷ of the random point (x,ŷ) by implicitly defining f (x) =ŷ instead of using the Lagrange interpolation method to calculate f (x ) for some x since the simulator cannot obtain an element for f (0) = α by using the partitioning method. To generate a private key for ID * , the simulator assigns a random leaf node v u * to the identity ID * and creates each personalized private key for a subset S i, j in PV u * by using a random point (x,ŷ) that implicitly defines a random polynomial f GL (x) for the group GL. To generate an update key for T * , the simulator obtains CV RI * from the given revocation identity set R * and creates each time-constrained update key for a subset S i, j in CV RI * by using a random point (x,ŷ) that implicitly defines a random polynomial f GL (x) for the group GL. Note that the simulation is only possible in the selective revocation list model since R * is needed to generate the update key for T * . However, the above proof idea is not enough to assure us the soundness of the proof. For the assurance, we should show that a subset S i, j of the private key query for ID * and a subset S i, j of the update key query for T * should be the same member ML in a group GL if they belong to the same group GL to use the above simulation technique that uses a random point (x,ŷ). At first, we have that each subset in the private set PV u * for ID * belongs to different groups since PV u * is associated with a path, and each subset in the covering set CV RI * for T * also belongs to different groups since CV RI * is a partition. If a subset S i, j of PV u * and a subset S i, j of CV RI * belong to the same group GL, then j = j by the correctness of the SD scheme since ID * ∈ R * . Thus, two subsets S i, j and S i, j should be the same member ML in the group GL.
Theorem 3.2. The above RIBE scheme is secure in the selective revocation list model under chosen plaintext attacks if the DBDH assumption holds. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above RIBE scheme with a non-negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the DBDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D = ((p, G, G T , e), g, g a , g b , g c ) and Z where Z = Z 0 = e(g, g) abc or Z = Z 1 ∈ R G T . Then B that interacts with A is described as follows:
Init: A initially submits a challenge identity ID * , a challenge time T * , and a revoked identity set R * on the time T * . Setup: B implicitly sets α = ab and proceeds as follows:
1. It first obtains BT by running SD.Setup(N max ). It sets UL and FL as an empty one respectively. It assigns ID * to a random index u * and saves (ID * , u * ) to UL. For each ID ∈ R * \ {ID * }, it assigns ID to a random index u such that ( * , u) / ∈ UL and saves (ID, u) to UL. From R * , it also defines the revoked index set RI * by using UL.
2. It obtains PV u * and CV RI * by running SD.Assign(BT , u * ) and SD.Cover(BT , RI * ) respectively. If ID * ∈ R * , then it sets FixedSubset(ID * , R * ) = PV u * ∪CV RI * . Otherwise, it sets FixedSubset(ID * , R * ) = CV RI * . It sets the function list FL as follows:
Note that f GL (x) is implicitly defined by two points (0, α) and (x,ŷ) by using the Lagrange interpolation method.
3. It sets RL as an empty one and sets ST = (BT ,UL). It selects random exponents h 0 , h 1 ∈ Z p and publishes public parameters PP as
Phase 1: A adaptively requests a polynomial number of private key, update key, and decryption key queries. If this is a private key query for an identity ID, then B proceeds as follows:
• Case ID = ID * : It performs the following steps:
1. It first selects a random exponent r 1 ∈ Z p and builds temporal private key components for the
and saves (ID, u) to UL. Next, it obtains PV u = {S i, j } by running SD.Assign(BT , u). ŷ) ) from FL and performs the following:
For each
Recall thatx = L j from the setup phase. It selects a random exponent r 1 ∈ Z p and builds a personalized private key by implicitly setting f GL (L j ) =ŷ as
Recall thatx = L j sincex is a random value from the setup phase. It sets I = {0,x} and calculates two Lagrange coefficients ∆ 0,I (L j ) and ∆x ,I (L j ). Next, it selects a random exponents r 1 ∈ Z p and builds a personalized private key as
4. Finally, it creates a private key SK ID = PV u , PSK ID,S i, j S i, j ∈PV u .
• Case ID = ID * : In this case, we have ID * ∈ R * . It performs the following steps:
1. It loads (ID * , u * ) from UL where u * is the pre-assigned index for ID * . Next, it obtains PV u * = {S i, j } by running SD.Assign(BT , u * ).
) from FL and performs the following steps: Recall thatx = L j from the setup phase. It selects a random exponent r 1 ∈ Z p and builds a personalized private key by implicitly setting f GL (L j ) =ŷ as
3. Finally, it creates a private key SK ID * = PV u * , PSK ID * ,S i, j S i, j ∈PV u * .
If this is an update key query for a time T , then B proceeds as follows:
• Case T = T * : It performs the following steps.
1. It first selects a random exponent r 2 ∈ Z p and builds temporal update key components for the
It defines the revoked identity set R on the time T and the revoked index set RI of R. Next, it obtains CV RI = {S i, j } by running SD.Cover(BT , RI).
3.
For each S i, j ∈ CV RI , it retrieves (GL = L i d j , (x,ŷ)) from FL and performs the following:
-Case S i, j ∈ FixedSubset(ID * , R * ): It selects a random exponent r 2 ∈ Z p and creates a timeconstrained update key by implicitly setting f GL (L j ) =ŷ as
-Case S i, j ∈ FixedSubset(ID * , R * ): It sets I = {0,x} and calculates two Lagrange coefficients ∆ 0,I (L j ) and ∆ẑ ,I (L j ). Next, it selects a random exponent r 2 ∈ Z p and builds a time-constrained update key as
4. Finally, it creates an update key UK T,R = CV RI , TUK T,S i, j S i, j ∈CV RI .
• Case T = T * : In this case, we have R = R * . It performs the following steps:
1. It first defines the revoked identity set R on the time T and the revoked index set RI of R. Next, it obtains CV RI * = {S i, j } by running SD.Cover(BT , RI * ).
2.
For each S i, j ∈ CV RI * , it performs the following steps: It sets GL = L i d j and retrieves (GL, (x,ŷ)) from FL. Next, it selects a random exponent r 2 ∈ Z p and builds a time-constrained update key by implicitly setting f GL (L j ) =ŷ as
3. Finally, it creates an update key
If this is a decryption key query for an identity ID and a time T , then B proceeds as follows:
• Case ID = ID * : If (ID, * ) / ∈ UL, then it selects a random index u such that ( * , u) / ∈ UL and saves (ID, u) to UL. It selects random exponents r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z p and creates a decryption key DK ID,T by implicitly setting r 1 = −b/(ID − ID * ) + r 1 as
• Case ID = ID * : In this case, we have T = T * from the restriction of Definition 2.7. It selects random exponents r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z p and creates a decryption key DK ID,T implicitly setting r 2 = −b/(T − T * ) + r 2 as
If this is a revocation query for an identity ID and a time T , then B updates RL by running RIBE.Revoke(ID, T, RL, ST ).
Challenge: A submits two challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 . B chooses a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and creates the challenge ciphertext CT * by implicitly setting s = c as
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1. Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess µ ∈ {0, 1}. B outputs 0 if µ = µ or 1 otherwise.
To finish the proof, we first show that the simulation is correct. The public parameters is correct since random exponents u 1 , h 1 , u 2 , h 2 ∈ Z p are chosen. We show that the private keys are correct. In case of ID = ID * , we have that a personalized private key for S i, j such that S i, j / ∈ FixedSubset(ID * , R * ) is correctly distributed from the setting r 1 = (−b/(ID − ID * ) + r 1 )∆ 0,I (L j ) + r 1 as
In case of ID = ID * , we have that a personalized private key for S i, j is correctly distributed from the setting L j =x and f GL (x) =ŷ as
Next, we show that the update keys are correct. In case of T = T * , we have that a time-constrained update key for S i, j such that S i, j / ∈ FixedSubset(ID * , R * ) is correctly distributed from the setting
In case of T = T * , we have that a time-constrained update key for S i, j is correctly distributed from the setting L j =x and f GL (x) =ŷ as
We show that the decryption keys are correct. In case of ID = ID * , the decryption key is correctly distributed by setting r 1 = −b/(ID − ID * ) + r 1 as
In case of ID = ID * , the decryption key is correctly distributed by setting r 2 = −b/(T − T * ) + r 2 as
Finally, we show that the challenge ciphertext is correct. If Z = Z 0 = e(g, g) abc is given, then the challenge ciphertext is correctly distributed as
Otherwise, the component C of the challenge ciphertext is independent of δ in the A's view since Z 1 is a random element in G T . Let η be a random bit for Z η . From the above simulation, we have Pr
(λ ) since the distribution of the simulation is correct, and we also have Pr[µ = µ |η = 1] = 1 2 since µ is completely hidden to A. Therefore we can obtain the following equation
This completes our proof.
Discussions
Efficiency. In our RIBE scheme that employs the SD scheme, the public parameters, a private key, an update key, and a ciphertext consist of O(1), O(log 2 N max ), O(r), and O(1) number of group elements respectively where N max is the maximum number of users and r is the number of revoked users in an update key. Compared with the previous RIBE scheme that employs the CS scheme that has O(log N max ) number of group elements in a private key and O(r log(N max /r)) number of group elements in an update key, our RIBE scheme can reduce the number of group elements in an update key by increasing the number of group elements in a private key. If we use the LSD scheme of Halevy and Shamir [15] instead of the SD scheme, then we can reduce the number of group element in a private key to O(log 1.5 N max ).
Removing Stored Polynomials. The setup algorithm of our RIBE scheme should maintain the function list FL that stores a random polynomial f (x) of degree one for each group in a tree. If N max is the maximum number of users in the system, then the maximum number of groups is N max log N max since a group is defined by a node v i that is not a leaf node in the tree and a depth d j in the tree. A pseudo-random function PRF can be used to remove FL. That is, the master key MK consists of a random exponent α and a seed z for PRF, and a random polynomial f GL (x) for a group can be defined as f GL (x) = a GL x + α where GL is a group label and a GL = PRF z (GL). The security of this modified scheme also holds from the security of the pseudo-random function.
Supporting an Exponential Number of Users. Our RIBE scheme takes the maximum number of users N max as an input and assigns each user to a leaf node of a binary tree with depth log N max . To support an exponential number of users, a binary tree with depth 2λ can be used where λ is a security parameter and the bit size of an identity is 2λ . Additionally, a random function f GL (x) can be deterministically generated by using a pseudo-random function PRF instead of keeping a function list FL. Furthermore, if a user is assigned to a leaf node of a tree such that the label L of the leaf node is equal to the identity string ID, then the user list UL is not needed.
Layered Subset Difference. Compared with the previous RIBE scheme that employs the CS scheme, our RIBE scheme that uses the SD scheme reduce the number of group elements in update keys from O(r log(N max /r)) to O(r), but it increases the number of group elements in private keys from O(log N max ) to O(log 2 N max ). To reduce the size of private keys in RIBE, we can use the layered subset difference (LSD) scheme of Halevy and Shamir [15] . In the LSD scheme, the number of subsets in a private set PV u is O(log 1.5 N max ) and the number of subsets in a covering set CV R is still O(r). Our RIBE scheme also can employ the LSD scheme since the LSD scheme is a special case of the SD scheme. The security proof of this RIBE scheme that uses the LSD scheme also holds.
Comparison with the RIBE scheme of Boldyreva et al. Compared with the previous RIBE schemes, our RIBE scheme and the RIBE scheme of Boldyreva et al. [4] has the similarity of using a random polynomial of degree one. However, the purpose of using a random polynomial is quite different between two schemes since we use a random polynomial of degree one for single member revocation to integrate with the SD scheme whereas they use a degree one polynomial for the FIBE scheme of Sahai and Waters [35] .
Chosen-Ciphertext Security. The proposed RIBE scheme only provides the indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). To provide the stronger indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) where an adversary can request decryption queries, we can use the general transformation of Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [9] since our RIBE scheme can be easily modified to support the HIBE scheme with 3-level of Boneh and Boyen [5] . That is, we can use the additional level of HIBE to provide the integrity of ciphertexts by using an one-time signature scheme. The proof of IND-CCA security easily follows since the decryption queries can be easily simulated by the private key delegation capability of the HIBE scheme.
Achieving Full Security. The security of our RIBE scheme is only proven in the selective revocation list model that is weaker than the well-known selective model since the revocation identity set R * should be additionally given. The previous RIBE schemes that employ the CS scheme were already proven in the full model by using a fully secure IBE scheme since the assigned key of a subset in the CS scheme is independent with each other [25, 37] . However, it is not easy to prove the full security of our RIBE scheme by using a fully secure IBE scheme and a partitioning method since the assigned key of a subset in the SD scheme is dependent of each member in a group. In Section 4, we show that our RIBE scheme in compositeorder bilinear groups can be proven in the full model if we use the dual system encryption technique of Waters [24, 41] instead of using the partitioning method.
Revocable IBE with Full Security
In this section, we propose an RIBE scheme in composite-order bilinear groups and prove its full security under static assumptions.
Bilinear Groups of Composite Order
Let N = p 1 p 2 p 3 where p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 are distinct prime numbers. Let G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of same composite order N and g be a generator of G. The bilinear map e : G × G → G T has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u, v ∈ G and ∀a, b ∈ Z N , e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab .
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃g such that e(g, g) has order N, that is, e(g, g) is a generator of G T .
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operations in G and G T as well as the bilinear map e are all efficiently computable. Furthermore, we assume that the description of G and G T includes generators of G and G T respectively. We use the notation G p i to denote the subgroups of order p i of G respectively. Similarly, we use the notation G T,p i to denote the subgroups of order p i of G T respectively.
Complexity Assumptions
We present tree static assumptions that were introduced by Lewko and Waters [24] . Assumption 4.1 (Subgroup Decision). Let (N, G, G T , e) be a description of the bilinear group of composite order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 . Let g p 1 , g p 2 , g p 3 be generators of subgroups G p 1 , G p 2 , G p 3 respectively. The Assumption is that if the challenge tuple D = ((N, G, G T , e), g p 1 , g p 3 ) and Z, are given, no PPT algorithm A can distinguish Z = Z 0 = X 1 from Z = Z 1 = X 1 R 1 with more than a negligible advantage. The advantage of A is defined as Adv
where the probability is taken over random choices of X 1 ∈ G p 1 and R 1 ∈ G p 2 .
Assumption 4.2 (General Subgroup Decision)
. Let (N, G, G T , e) be a description of the bilinear group of composite order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 . Let g p 1 , g p 2 , g p 3 be generators of subgroups G p 1 , G p 2 , G p 3 respectively. The Assumption is that if the challenge tuple
with more than a negligible advantage. The advantage of B is defined as Adv
where the probability is taken over random choices of 
where the probability is taken over random choices of a, b, c ∈ Z N , and R 1 , R 2 ∈ G p 2 .
Construction
Let ∆ i,I be a Lagrange coefficient which is defined as ∆ i,I (x) = ∏ j∈I, j =i x− j i− j for an index i ∈ Z N and a set of indexes I in Z N . Our RIBE scheme is described as follows:
1. It first generates a bilinear group G of composite order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 where p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 are random primes. Let g 1 be a random generator of G p 1 . It selects a random exponent α ∈ Z N and random elements
2. It obtains BT by running SD.Setup(N max ). Let S be the collection of all subsets S i, j of BT . For each S i, j ∈ S, it sets GL = L i d j and performs the following steps: If (GL, * ) / ∈ FL, then it selects a random polynomial f GL (x) of degree 1 such that f GL (0) = α and saves (GL, f GL (x)) to FL. 3. It outputs a master key MK = (α, FL), an empty revocation list RL, a state ST = (BT ,UL), and public parameters
1. It first randomly assigns the identity ID to a leaf node v u in BT that is not yet assigned where u ∈ N is an index assigned to ID. It saves (ID, u) to UL. Next, it obtains PV u = {S i, j } by running SD.Assign(BT , u).
2.
For each S i, j ∈ PV u , it performs the following steps: It sets GL = L i d j and retrieves (GL, f GL (x)) from FL. Next, it selects random r 1 ∈ Z N , Y 0 ,Y 1 ∈ G p 3 and creates a personalized private key as
3. Finally, it outputs the state ST and a private key SK ID = PV u , PSK ID,S i, j S i, j ∈PV u .
RIBE.UpdateKey(T, RL, MK, ST, PP):
This algorithm takes as input a time T , the revocation list RL, the master key MK, the state ST = (BT ,UL, FL), and public parameters PP.
It first defines the revoked set R of user identities on the time T from RL. That is, if there exists
It also defines the revoked index set RI ⊆ N of the revoked identity set R by using UL. Next, it obtains CV RI = {S i, j } by running SD.Cover(BT , RI).
2.
For each S i, j ∈ CV R , it performs the following steps: It sets GL = L i d j and retrieves (GL, f GL (x)) from FL. Next, it selects random r 2 ∈ Z N , Y 0 ,Y 1 ∈ G p 3 and creates a time-constrained update key as
3. Finally, it outputs the state ST and an update key UK T,R = CV RI , TUK T,S i, j S i, j ∈CV RI .
RIBE.DeriveKey(SK ID ,UK T,R , PP):
This algorithm takes as input a private key SK ID = (PV u , {PSK ID,S i, j }) for an identity ID, an update key UK T,R = (CV RI , {TUK T,S i, j }) for a time T and a revoked set R of identities, and the public parameters PP.
Otherwise, it outputs ⊥. 2. It retrieves TUK T,S i, j = (U 0 ,U 1 ) from UK T,R , and PSK ID,S i , j = (K 0 , K 1 ) from SK ID . Next, it sets I = {L j , L j } and calculates two Lagrange coefficients ∆ L j ,I (0) and ∆ L j ,I (0) by using the fact L j = L j . It chooses random r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z N , Y 0 ,Y 1 ,Y 2 ∈ G p 3 and creates decryption key components as
Finally, it outputs a decryption key DK ID,T
= D 0 , D 1 , D 2 .
RIBE.Encrypt(ID, T, M, PP):
This algorithm takes as input an identity ID, a time T , a message M, and the public parameters PP. It first chooses a random exponent s ∈ Z N and outputs a ciphertext by implicitly including ID and T as 
RIBE.Decrypt(CT

RIBE.Revoke(ID, T, RL, ST ):
This algorithm is the same as that of Section 3.3.
Security Analysis
To prove the security of our RIBE scheme in composite-order bilinear groups, we use the dual system encryption technique of Waters [24, 41] . The dual system encryption technique was successfully used to prove the security of HIBE, ABE, and PE schemes [22, 24, 32, 41] . However, the the dual system encryption does not directly applicable to the RIBE scheme since the adversary of RIBE can request a private key query for a challenge identity ID * and an update key query for a challenge time T * that were not allowed in IBE, HIBE, and ABE. Note that the dual system encryption technique essentially uses those restrictions of adversary in IBE, HIBE, and ABE when it changes normal private keys to semi-functional private keys to solve the paradox of dual system encryption. To handle the private key query for ID * and the update key query for T * in RIBE, we need different techniques for dual system encryption. We organize personalized private keys in a private key and time-constrained update keys in an update key in the order of groups, and change those keys in the same group from normal to semi-functional through hybrid games. Note that this strategy that change keys in the same group from normal to semi-functional was used in the security proof of RS-ABE [18, 34] . In contrast to the RS-ABE scheme that uses the CS scheme, our RIBE scheme uses the SD scheme that has a complex key assignment part and this makes it difficult for us to prove the security. To overcome this difficulty, we carefully redesign semi-functional types and hybrid games by using the fact that there are only one private key query for ID * and one update key query for T * in RIBE that match to the challenge ciphertext.
Theorem 4.4. The above RIBE scheme is fully secure under chosen plaintext attacks if the SD, GSD, and DBDH assumptions hold. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv
(λ ) where q is the maximum number of private key, update key, and decryption key queries of A.
Proof. We first define the semi-functional type of private keys, update keys, decryption keys, and ciphertexts. For the semi-functional type, we let g 2 denote a fixed generator of the subgroup G p 2 .
RIBE.GenKeySF. This algorithm first creates a normal private key SK ID = (PV u , {PSK ID,S i, j } S i, j ∈PV u ) by using MK where PV u = {S i, j } and PSK ID,S i, j = (K 0 , K 1 ). For each S i, j ∈ PV u , it chooses a random exponent δ i, j ∈ Z N once for S i, j and builds a semi-functional personalized private key PSK ID,S i, j =
RIBE.UpdateKeySF. This algorithm first creates a normal update key UK T,R = (CV RI , {TUK T,S i, j } S i, j ∈CV RI ) by using MK. For each S i, j ∈ CV RI , it chooses a random exponent δ i, j ∈ Z N once for S i, j and builds a semi-functional time-constrained private key TUK T,
It outputs a semifunctional update key UK T,R = (CV RI , {PUK T,S i, j } S i, j ∈CV RI ).
RIBE.DeriveKeySF. This algorithm first creates a normal decryption key DK ID,T = (D 0 , D 1 , D 2 ) by using MK. It chooses a random exponent a ∈ Z N and outputs a semi-functional decryption key
RIBE.EncryptSF. This algorithm first creates a normal ciphertext CT ID,T = (C ,C 0 ,C 1 ,C 2 ). It chooses random exponents c,
.
Note that if a semi-functional decryption key is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, then the decryption fails since an additional random element e(g 2 , g 2 ) ac is left.
To prove the security, we use a sequence of hybrid games. For the hybrid games that change personalized private keys (or time-constrained update keys) that are related with a subset S i, j from normal ones to semifunctional ones, we need to state additional information of a subset S i, j in BT . Note that a personalized private key for S i, j and a time-constrained update key for S i , j share the same polynomial f (x) if i = i ∧ d j = d j since they belong to the same group GL = L i d j where L i = L(v i ) and d j is the depth of v j . Thus we associate a personalized private key (or a time-constrained update key) with a tuple of indexes (i g , i m , i c ) to state additional information about the group GL where i g is a group index, i m is a member index, and i c is a counter index.
Suppose that a personalized private key (or a time-constrained update key) is related with a subset S i, j , Then this key has a group label GL = L i d j and a member label ML = L j . The group index i g for personalized private keys (or time-constrained update keys) is assigned as follows: If the group GL appears first time in queries, then we set i g as the number of distinct group GL in previous queries plus one. If the group GL already appeared before in queries, then we set i g as the value i g of previous personalized private key (or time-constrained update key) with the same group GL. The member index i m for the group i g is assigned as follows: If the member ML for this group GL appears first time in queries, then we set i m as the number of distinct members for this group GL in previous queries plus one. If the member ML for this group already appeared before in queries, then we set i m as the value i m of previous one. The counter index i c is assigned as follows: If the group and member (GL, ML) appears first time in queries, then we set i c as one. If the group and member (GL, ML) appeared before in queries, then we set i c as the number of queries with the group and member (GL, ML) that appeared before plus one.
The security proof consists of the sequence of hybrid games: The first game will be the original security game and the last one will be a game such that the adversary has no advantage. We define the games as follows:
Game G 0 . This game is the original security game. In this game, all personalized private keys, timeconstrained update keys, decryption keys, and the challenge ciphertext are normal.
Game G 1 . In the next game, all personalized private keys, time-constrained update keys, and decryption keys are normal, but the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
Game G 2 . Next, we define a new game G 2 . In this game, all personalized private keys, time-constrained update keys, and the challenge ciphertext are semi-functional, but decryption keys are normal. For the security proof, we additionally define a sequence of games G 1,1 , . . . , G 1,h , . . . , G 1,q g where G 1 = G 1,0 and q g is the maximum number of groups that are used in private keys and update keys. In the game G 1,h for 1 ≤ h ≤ q g , the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional, personalized private keys and timeconstrained update keys with a group index i g such that i g ≤ h are semi-functional, and the remaining personalized private keys and time-constrained update keys with an index i g such that h < i g are normal. It is obvious that G 1,q g = G 2 .
Game G 3 . In this game G 3 , all personalized private keys, time-constrained update keys, decryption keys, and the the challenge ciphertext are semi-functional.
Game G 4 . In the final game G 4 , all personalized private keys, time-constrained update keys, decryption keys, and the challenge ciphertext are semi-functional, but the challenge ciphertext component C is random.
Let Adv
G j
A be the advantage of A in the game G j . We easily obtain that Adv
, and Adv G 4 A = 0. Through the following Lemmas 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.10, we can obtain the following equation
where q = q sk + q uk + q dk . This completes our proof.
Lemma 4.5. If the SD assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between G 0 and G 1 with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G 0 and G 1 with a non-negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the SD assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D = ((N, G, G T , e), g p 1 , g p 3 ) and Z where
Then B that interacts with A is described as follows:
Setup: B first chooses random exponents u 1 , h 1 , u 2 , h 2 , α ∈ Z N . It sets BT by running SD.Setup and FL by selecting f GL (x) for each GL in BT . It sets MK = (α, FL), RL = / 0, ST = (BT ,UL = / 0), and publishes
Phase 1: To response queries, B creates normal keys by running the normal algorithms since it knows MK. Note that it cannot create semi-functional keys since it does not know g p 2 .
Challenge: A submits a challenge identity ID * , a challenge time T * , and challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 . B flips a random coin µ ∈ {0, 1} and creates a challenge ciphertext CT * by implicitly setting g s to be the If Z = Z 0 = X 1 , then the simulation is the same as G 0 since the challenge ciphertext is correctly distributed. If Z = Z 1 = X 1 R 1 , then the simulation is the same as G 1 since the challenge ciphertext is generated as semi-functional by implicitly setting Proof. We first divide the behavior of an adversary as two types: Type-I and Type-II. We next show that this lemma holds for two types of the adversary. Let ID * and T * be the challenge identity and the challenge time respectively. The two types of adversaries are formally defined as follows:
Type-I. An adversary is Type-I if it queries on an identity ID such that ID = ID * for at least one personalized private key with the group index h, or it queries on a time T such that T = T * for at least one timeconstrained update key with the group index h. More specifically, this adversary can be divided as follows:
• Type-I-A. This adversary queries on an identity ID such that ID = ID * for all personalized private keys with the group index h, and it queries on a time T such that T = T * for at least one time-constrained update key with the group index h.
• Type-I-B. This adversary queries on a time T such that T = T * for all time-constrained update keys with h, and it queries on an identity ID such that ID = ID * for at least one personalized private key with h.
• Type-I-C. This adversary queries on an identity ID such that ID = ID * for at least one personalized private key with h, and it queries on a time T such that T = T * for at least one timeconstrained update key with h.
Type-II. An adversary is Type-II if it queries on an identity ID such that ID = ID * for all personalized private keys with the group index h, and it queries on a time T such that T = T * for all time-constrained update keys with the group index h.
Let CV RI * be the covering set of the update key for the time T * and revoked set R * , and PV u * be the private set of the private key for the identity ID * . Let h * m be a member index of the group index h such that the personalized private key for ID * or the time-constrained update key for T * belong to the member index h * m . If the adversary is Type-I-A, then there is only one member index h * m since CV RI * is a partition. If the adversary is In Type-I-B, then there is only one member index h * m since PV u * is related with a path. If the adversary is Type-I-C, the member index h * m of CV RI * with the group index h should be the same as that of PV u * with the same group index h in the SD scheme if ID * ∈ R * . If the adversary is Type-II, then there is no member index h * m since the adversary does not request a key query for ID * or T * . For the Type-I adversary A I , we define hybrid games H (1,1),1 , H (1,1) ,2 , . . . , H (q m ,q c ),1 , H (q m ,q c ),2 = H (q m ,q c ),2 , H (q m ,q c ),1 , . . . , H (1,1),2 , H (1,1),1 , H (1,0) ,2 , H where G 1,h−1 = H (1,0),2 , H = G 1,h , q m is the maximum number of distinct member subsets of the group index h, and q c is the maximum number of queries for one member subset. The games are formally defined as follows:
Game H (h m ,h c ), 1 . This game H (h m ,h c ),1 for 1 ≤ h m ≤ q m and 1 ≤ h c ≤ q c is almost the same as G 1,h−1 except the generation of personalized private keys and time-constrained update keys with the group index h. These personalized private keys and time-constrained update keys with indexes (i g = h, i m , i c ) are generated as follows:
• Case i g < h: The keys (personalized private keys and time-constrained update keys) are generated as semi-functional.
• Case i g = h: The keys are generated as follows:
If this is a personalized private key query, then it generates a normal PSK = (K 0 , K 1 ) and creates the semi-functional personalized private key of type 2 as PSK ID,S i, j = K 0 = K 0 g a 2 , K 1 = K 1 by selecting a new random exponent a ∈ Z N . If this is a time-constrained update key query, then it generates a normal TUK = (U 0 ,U 1 ) and creates the semi-functional time-constrained update key of type 2 as TUK T,
If this is a personalized private key query, then it generates a normal PSK = (K 0 , K 1 ) and creates the semi-functional personalized private key of type 1 as PSK ID,S i,
selecting new random exponents a, b ∈ Z N . If this is a time-constrained update key query, then it generates a normal TUK = (U 0 ,U 1 ) and creates the semi-functional time-constrained update key of type 1 as TUK T,
It simply creates a normal type key.
• Case i g > h: The keys are generated as normal.
Note that if a semi-functional personalized private key of type 1 and a normal time-constrained update key are used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, then the decryption fails since an additional random element e(g 2 , g 2 ) c(a−bd 1 ) is left. If a = bd 1 , then the the decryption succeeds and this personalized private key is nominally semi-functional of type 1. Similarly, if a semi-functional time-constrained update key of type 1 and a normal personalized private key are used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, then the decryption fails since an additional random element e(g 2 , g 2 ) c(a−bd 1 ) is left. If a = bd 1 , then the the decryption succeeds and this time-constrained update key is nominally semifunctional of type 1.
Game H (h m ,h c ),2 . This game H (h m ,h c ),2 is almost the same as H (h m ,h c ),1 except that the personalized private key (or the time-constrained update key) with the indexes
is generated with b = 0. In the game H (q m ,q c ),2 , all personalized private keys and timeconstrained update keys with the group index h are semi-functional of type 2 except that personalized private keys and time-constrained update keys with the member index h * m are normal.
Game H (h m ,h c ), 1 . This game H (h m ,h c ),1 is almost the same as H (h m ,h c ),1 except the generation of a personalized private key (or a time-constrained update key) with the indexes
. These personalized private keys (or time-constrained update keys) are generated as follows: 
If this is a time-constrained update key query, then it generates TUK = (U 0 ,U 1 ) as the same as H (h m ,h c ),1 and creates the semi-functional time-constrained update key as TUK T,S i,
It creates a semi-functional key by using the fixed δ i, j for this member subset S i, j .
Game I (h m ,h c ), 1 . This game I (h m ,h c ),1 is almost the same as H (h m ,h c ),1 except that there is no case i m = h * m since the adversary is Type-II.
Game I (h m ,h c ),2 . This game I (h m ,h c ),1 is almost the same as H (h m ,h c ),1 except that there is no case i m = h * m since the adversary is Type-II. In the game I (1,0),2 , all personalized private keys and all time-constrained update keys with the group index h are semi-functional where a fixed δ i, j is used for each member.
Let Adv Let E I , E II be the event such that an adversary behave like the Type-I, Type-II adversary respectively. From the above three inequalities for three types, we have the following inequality as
This completes our proof. Proof. Let q dk be the number of decryption key queries of an adversary. For the security proof, we additionally define a sequence of games G 2,1,1 , G 2,1,2 , . . . , G 2,k,1 , G 2,k,2 , . . . , G 2,q dk ,1 , G 2,q dk ,2 where G 2 = G 2,0,2 . The games are defined as follows:
Game G 2,k,1 . In this game, all personalized private keys, all time-constrained update keys, and the challenge ciphertext are semi-functional. The first k − 1 decryption keys are semi-functional. The kth decryption key is semi-functional of type 1 and it is generated as
is a normal decryption key and a, b 1 , b 2 are random exponents in Z N . The remaining decryption keys are normal.
Game G 2,k,2 . In this game, all personalized private keys, all time-constrained update keys, the challenge ciphertext header, and the first k decryption keys are semi-functional. But the remaining decryption keys are normal. It is obvious that G 2,q dk ,2 = G 3 .
Note that if a semi-functional decryption key of type 1 is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, then the decryption fails since an additional random element e(g 2 ,
then the the decryption succeeds. In this case, we say that the decryption key is nominally semi-functional of type 1. Let Adv
be the advantage of A in the game G 2,i, j . We easily obtain that Adv
. From the following Claims 4.8 and 4.9, we can obtain the following equation
Claim 4.8. If the GSD assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between G 2,k−1,2 and G 2,k,1 with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A I that distinguishes between G 2,k−1,2 and G 2,k,1 with a nonnegligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the GSD assumption using A I is given: a challenge tuple
Then B that interacts with A I is described as follows:
Phase 1: For each query, B proceeds as follows: If this is a personalized private key (or time-constrained update key) query, then it creates a semi-functional one by using MK and R 2 Y 1 given in the assumption. If this is a jth decryption key query for ID and T , then it handles this query as follows:
• If j < k, then it creates a semi-functional decryption key since it knows MK and R 2 Y 1 is given in the assumption.
• If j > k, then it creates a normal decryption key since it knows MK.
Challenge: B flips a random coin µ ∈ {0, 1} and creates a semi-functional ciphertext by implicitly setting g s = X 1 and g c 2 = R 1 as If Z = Z 0 = X 2 Y 2 , then the simulation is the same as G 2,k−1,2 since the kth decryption key and the semi-functional challenge ciphertext are correctly distributed by implicitly setting r 1 ≡ log g (X 2 )r 1 mod p 1 , r 2 ≡ log g (X 2 )r 2 mod p 1 , and s ≡ log g (X 1 ) mod p 1 . If Z = Z 1 = X 2 R 3 Y 2 , then the simulation is almost the same as G 2,k,1 except that the kth decryption key is generated as a nominally semi-functional one of type 1 by implicitly setting
To finish the proof, we should argue that the adversary cannot distinguish the nominally semifunctional decryption key from the semi-functional decryption key of type 1. To argue this, we use the restriction of the security model such that a decryption key query for an identity ID and a time T such that (ID = ID * ) ∧ (T = T * ) is not allowed. Suppose there exists an unbounded adversary. Then the adversary can gather the values a ≡ b 1 (u 1 ID + h 1 ) + b 2 (u 2 T + h 2 ), b 1 , b 2 mod p 2 from the kth decryption key and
mod p 2 and u 2 T * + h 2 mod p 2 look random to the adversary since u i x + h i is a pair-wise independent function, (ID = ID * ) ∨ (T = T * ) by the restriction of the security model, and u 1 , h 1 , u 2 , h 2 mod p 2 are information theoretically hidden to the adversary. This completes our proof. Claim 4.9. If the GSD assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between G 2,k,1 and G 2,k,2 with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. The proof of this claim is almost the same as that of Claim 4.8, except the generation of the kth decryption key. The kth decryption key for ID and T is generated as follows:
Note that the kth decryption key is no longer correlated with CT * since the element D 0 is re-randomized by 
c . Then B that interacts with A is described as follows:
Setup: B chooses random exponents u 1 , h 1 , u 2 , h 2 ∈ Z N and implicitly sets α = a from the term g a p 1 R 1 . It sets BT by running SD.Setup and FL by selecting a random point (x, y) for each GL in BT . Note that a random f GL (x) for GL is implicitly defined by two points (0, a) and (x, y) and g
R for any L j can be computable from the Lagrange interpolation method where R ∈ G p 2 . It sets RL = / 0, ST = (BT ,UL = / 0) and publishes the public parameters
For each query, B creates a semi-functional key since g a 2 R 1 and g 2 are given from the assumption. Note that it cannot create a normal update key since it does not know g a p 1 ∈ G p 1 . Challenge: B first flips a random coin µ ∈ {0, 1} and creates a challenge ciphertext 
Setup: B selects random exponents u 1 , h 1 , u 2 , h 2 , α ∈ Z N . It sets BT by running SD.Setup and FL by selecting f GL (x) for each GL in BT . It sets MK = (α, FL), RL = / 0, ST = (BT ,UL = / 0), and
Phase 1: Let h * m be a member index of the group index h such that the personalized private key for ID * or the time-constrained update key for T * belong to the member index h * m such that 1 ≤ h * m ≤ q m where q m is the maximum number of members in the group index h. As mentioned before, there is only one index h * m in the Type-I adversary. B selects a random index k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ q m to guess h * m , and it can correctly guess h * m with the probability of 1/q m . Note that q m ≤ q sk + q uk since the private set of a private key is related with a path and the covering set of an update key is a partition where q sk is the number of private key queries and q uk is the number of update key queries of the adversary.
For each query, B proceeds as follows: If this is a decryption key query, then it creates a normal one since it knows MK. If this is a personalized private key or a time-constrained update key query with indexes (i g , i m , i c ), then it handles this query as follows:
• Case i g < h: It first builds a normal key since it knows MK and converts it to a semi-functional one by using R 2 Y 1 that is given in the assumption and selecting a random exponent δ i, j once for the subset S i, j .
• Case i g = h: It generates the key as follows:
If this is a personalized private key query, then it first builds a normal one and converts it to a semi-functional one of type 2 by selecting a new random exponent a ∈ Z N as PSK ID,S i,
If this is a time-constrained update key query, then it first builds a normal one and converts it to a semi-functional one of type 2 by selecting a new random exponent a ∈ Z N as TUK T,S i, -(i m = h * m ): It creates a normal key since it knows MK.
• Case i g > h: It creates a normal key since it knows MK.
Challenge: B flips a random coin µ ∈ {0, 1} and creates a semi-functional ciphertext by implicitly setting g s = X 1 and g c 2 = R 1 as CT * = C = e(X 1 R 1 , g) α ·M * µ , C 0 = X 1 R 1 , C 1 = (X 1 R 1 ) u 1 ID * +h 1 , C 2 = (X 1 R 1 ) u 2 T * +h 2 . Phase 2: Same as Phase 1. Guess: A outputs a guess µ . If µ = µ , then B outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
If Z = Z 0 = X 2 Y 2 , then the simulation is the same as H (h m ,h c −1),2 since the personalized private key (or the time-constrained update key) with (i m = h * m ) ∧ (i m = h m ) ∧ (i c = h c ) and the semi-functional challenge ciphertext are correctly distributed by implicitly setting r 1 ≡ log g (X 2 ) mod p 1 (or r 2 ≡ log g (X 2 ) mod p 1 ), and s ≡ log g (X 1 ) mod p 1 . If Z = Z 1 = X 2 R 3 Y 2 , then the simulation is almost the same as H (h m ,h c ),1 except that the personalized private key (or the time-constrained update key) with (i m = h * m ) ∧ (i m = h m ) ∧ (i c = h c ) is generated as a nominally semi-functional one of type 1 by implicitly setting a ≡ log g 2 (R 3 )(u 1 ID + h 1 ) mod p 2 (or a ≡ log g 2 (R 3 )(u 2 T + h 2 ) mod p 2 ) and b ≡ log g 2 (R 3 ) mod p 2 .
To finish the proof, we should argue that the Type-I adversary cannot distinguish the nominally semifunctional one of type 1 from the semi-functional one of type 1. To argue this, we use the fact that we have h c ) is a time-constrained update key, then we also obtain that u 2 T + h 2 mod p 2 and u 2 T * + h 2 are random to the adversary since u 2 x + h 2 pair-wise independent function, T = T * if i m = h * m , and u 2 , h 2 mod p 2 are information theoretically hidden to the adversary. This completes our proof. 
If this is a time-constrained update key query, then it chooses random a ∈ Z N , Y 0 ,Y 1 ∈ G p 3 and creates a key as TUK T,S i,
Note that this personalized private key or time-constrained update key is no longer correlated with CT * since the element K 0 is re-randomized by (R 2 Y 1 ) a . The proofs of Claim 4.13 and Claim 4.14 are almost the same as that of Claim 4.11 and Claim 4.12 respectively. The only difference is that each element K 0 of personalized private keys and each element U 0 of time-constrained update keys with indexes (i g = h, i m , i c ) such that i m = h * m that are generated in Claim 4.11 and Claim 4.12 respectively are additionally multiplied by (R 2 Y 1 ) δ i, j where δ i, j is a fixed exponent that is related with the member subset S i, j . This modification is possible since R 2 Y 1 is given in the assumption. We omit the detailed proofs of these claims. Proof. The proof of this claim is almost the same as that of Claim 4.11 except that the generation of personalized private keys and time-constrained update keys with the group index i g = h. These keys with the group index i g = h are generated as follows:
• Case i g = h: Let δ i, j be a fixed exponent in Z N for each member S i, j in this group index h. An interesting open problem is to build efficient R-ABE, RS-ABE, and RS-PE schemes that provide the revocation functionality for ABE and PE by using the SD scheme. One may expect that our technique in this work can be used to achieve these schemes, but there is one crucial difficulty to prove the security of the schemes since our proof techniques in the selective revocation list model (or the full model) only work when there is only one private key (or one update key) that matches to a challenge ciphertext. However, there are many private key queries in ABE that can decrypt a challenge ciphertext. Thus, we expect that a new different technique will be needed to build R-ABE, RS-ABE, and RS-PE schemes that use the SD scheme.
